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This article examines the use of precedent in international criminal
adjudication and engages with the `theory of precedent' suggested
by Daniel Terris, Cesare P R Romano and Leigh Swigart. The article
considers the inapplicability of the doctrine of binding precedent in
this area. It also examines the principle of judicial comity, discussing
instances in which international criminal courts and tribunals have
appeared to depart from the findings of external judicial decisions.
It further considers the reliance of such courts and tribunals on
judicial decisions from both generalist and specialist international
courts, as well as from national courts, examining the process
of transposition associated with such reliance. It finds that the
approaches of international criminal courts and tribunals to the
use of external judicial decisions have generally been multiple,
incoherent and, in some cases, contradictory. In this respect, the
article finds little evidence for the view that it is possible to distil any
consistent `theory of precedent' from the practice of such courts and
tribunals.
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1 Introduction
Legal scholarship often characterises the use by courts and tribunals of judicial
decisions from other courts and tribunals (`external judicial decisions')1 as a sort
of inter-judicial dialogue. For instance, L'Heureux-Dubé, a former justice of the
Supreme Court of Canada, uses the word `dialogue' to describe the practice of
national courts citing, analysing, relying on, or distinguishing the decisions of
foreign and supranational tribunals.2 This interaction, however, remains a `messy
process' according to Slaughter, taking place across, above and below borders.3
She observes that `[t]he activities of the many different types of courts involved in
this process do not conform to a template of an emerging global legal system in
which national and international tribunals play defined and coordinated roles'.4
While there are many levels of judicial interaction, this article focuses on
the interaction of international criminal courts and tribunals, an under-explored
area in the literature. Terris, Romano and Swigart observe that `[t]he role of
precedent across international courts has not yet been thoroughly studied, since
it is only recently that the number of international rulings of most courts has
become sizeable'.5 Similarly, Romano notes that `[t]he role of precedent across
international courts is still a largely unmapped territory. While most literature
to date has focused on the treatment by courts of their own precedents, there
have been very few studies about the treatment of precedent across international
courts'.6
In the sphere of international criminal law, the question of interaction was
flagged as early as 1995, when the Tadić Trial Chamber asked whether the ICTY
is `bound by interpretations of other international judicial bodies or whether it
is at liberty to adapt those rulings to its own context'.7 In that case, the judges
1
This article makes use of the phrase `external judicial decisions' instead of the more encumbered
notion of `precedent'. For a discussion of this point, see N Miller, `An International Jurispru-
dence? The Operation of ``Precedent'' Across International Tribunals', (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of
International Law 483, 489.
2
C L'Heureux-Dubé, `The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact
of the Rehnquist Court' (1998) 34 Tulsa Law Journal 15, 24. See also `Developments in the Law:
International Criminal Law' (2001) 114 Harv Law Review 1943, 2049.
3




D Terris, C P R Romano & L Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and
Women Who Decide the World's Cases (2007) 120.
6
C P R Romano, `Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential Dialogue' (2009)
41 International Law & Politics 755, 760.
7
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (aka `Dule'), Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective
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found the lack of guidance on this subject in the Report of the Secretary-General
to be `particularly troubling because of the unique character of the International
Tribunal'.8 Yet almost two decades later there remains a relative scarcity of
normative guidance with respect to the use of external judicial decisions. For
instance, in 2009 the ICTY, in conjunction with the United Nations Interregional
Crime and Justice Research Institute, developed a Manual on Developed Practices,
prepared as part of a project to preserve the legacy of the ICTY. Although this
Manual runs into over 240 pages and aims to provide a `blueprint of [the ICTY's]
practices for use by other international and domestic courts', relatively little is
said therein about the ICTY's practices with respect to the use of external judicial
decisions.9 In this respect, Terris et al have observed that any official directives
or policies concerning the use of external judicial decisions, where they exist, are
`always tacit, never explicit', and may vary from court to court.10
Against the backdrop of the scarcity of normative guidance on this subject,
Terris, Romano and Swigart have found that a `theory of precedent' may be
emerging.11 Their research, conducted between 2004 and 2006, is primarily
based on qualitative interviews with international judges from various courts
and tribunals, including international criminal courts and tribunals. According
to Terris et al, it is possible to identify some consistent, systematic and general
approaches, on the part of international and regional courts and tribunals, to the
use of external judicial decisions.
This article sets out to `test' Terris et al's `theory of precedent' with particular
reference to the practice of international criminal courts and tribunals. In
particular, it aims to determine whether it is possible to distil any method or
`theory of precedent' from such practice; that is, whether any systematic and
general approaches to the use of external judicial decisions are emerging from
the practice of the international criminal courts and tribunals. In this respect, the
article is based on a qualitative analysis examining some of the final judgments of
five international criminal courts and tribunals, namely:
1. the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY );
2. the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR);




ICTY & United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, ICTY Manual on
Developed Practices (2009) 1.
10
Terris et al, above n 5, 120.
11
Ibid.
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3. the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL);
4. the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC); and
5. the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The specific judgments which constituted the primary sources for this analysis
have been listed in Annex I. The primary units of analysis were instances of use of
external judicial decisions in the judgments. With respect to the SCSL, the ECCC
and the ICC, in view of the relatively low number of final judgments delivered
by the cut-off date (18 May 2012), all final judgments have been included. With
respect to the ICTY and ICTR, the criteria for the selection of the final judgments
were: (1) the date of delivery of the judgments; and (2) the judgments had to make,
at least, some use of external judicial decisions.12
This article considers, first, the elements of the `theory of precedent,' as
elaborated in Terris et al's book. It then sets out to `test' this theory on the basis
of the practice of international criminal courts and tribunals. It examines the
inapplicability of the doctrine of binding precedent and discusses the principle
of judicial comity, considering instances in which international criminal courts
and tribunals have departed from the findings of external judicial decisions.
The article makes the point that there is a growing expectation, in the field of
international criminal adjudication, that such courts and tribunals ought to take
express account of relevant external judicial decisions, even if contradictory. The
article proceeds to consider the formal nature of the judicial acts that may be
relied on by international criminal courts and tribunals, considering that such
courts and tribunals have relied not only on final judgments and decisions, but
also, inter alia, on advisory opinions and the submissions of advocates-general.
The article then considers international criminal courts and tribunals' reliance
on judicial decisions from generalist and specialist courts and tribunals. In
particular, it discusses the use by such courts and tribunals of jurisprudence from
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as well as human rights courts. The article
also considers international criminal courts and tribunals' reliance on judicial
decisions from national courts and the process of transposition associated with
such reliance. It concludes by outlining some possible areas for further research.
12
In this context, minimal use was made of tables of authorities annexed to some of the judgments
because such annexes did not always portray an accurate picture of the external judicial decisions
actually used in the judgment.
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2 A `theory of precedent'
In their extensive study of international adjudication, Terris et al argue that,
although the role of precedent across international courts has not yet been
thoroughly studied, it seems that elements of `a sort of ``theory of precedent''
are gradually emerging'.13 In this respect, the authors proceed to sketch out the
elements of such a `theory of precedent', which include:
1. No international judge seems to feel bound by the jurisprudence of another
court. The jurisprudence of other courts is taken into consideration only
when one's own court has no useful precedents. Although some judges
might bemorewilling than others to cite, citing is generally done sparingly,
selectively, and grudgingly.14
2. If, on a given point of law, judges of one court feel differently than those
of another court, out of judicial comity they will simply omit to take
cognizance of judgments that do not support the reasoning chosen. Judges
avoid citing to say that `they got it wrong'—this is severely frowned upon.15
3. The formal nature of a judicial finding does not matter. Judges consider
decisions of other international courts regardless of whether they are
final or preliminary judgments, orders, nonbinding advisory opinions, or
anything else. They look at the jurisprudence rather than the specifics of
the case; what ultimately matters is only that the reasoning that led the
other tribunal to a given conclusion is legally sound and persuasive.16
4. In the judges' minds, international courts seem to be divided between
generalists, like the ICJ, and specialists (all others), and between regional
courts and the so-called universal courts, that is to say, those whose
jurisdiction is not restricted to any particular geographic area. This means
that specialised courts will consider, quote, and defer to the ICJ on matters
of general public international law. Arguably, this should also imply that
the ICJ will defer to specialised tribunals concerning matters over which
they have special knowledge or competence.17
13
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5. `Universal' courts might consider, but will refrain from quoting regional
courts. This stems from the perceived need not to attribute particular
value to the jurisprudence of certain regions in determining the content of
rules of international law that have universal reach. Moreover, relying on
the jurisprudence of national courts seems even more problematic. Much
like the case of international rulings, they are a documentary source that
can be used to provide evidence of a rule generated by one of the primary
sources. Yet, their impact on substantive international law is limited by
several factors.18
Against the backdrop of these elements, this article proceeds to examine whether
any coherent and systematic general approaches to the use of external judicial
decisions may be said to be emerging from the practice of international criminal
courts and tribunals. In this context, a notable difference between Terris et
al's study and the present research is that the former was not confined to
international criminal courts and tribunals only. In their study, Terris et al
included interviews not only with serving judges from the ICTY, the ICTR, the
SCSL and the ICC, but also with judges from other international and regional
courts and tribunals, such as the ICJ, the European Court of Human Rights, the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the World Trade Organization
Appellate Body.19 However, given that their `theory of precedent' is not qualified
or restricted to any specific type of court, and is expressed in language that is
all-encompassing, it appears to also be applicable to international criminal courts
and tribunals. This article considers whether Terris et al's `theory of precedent'
provides an appropriate framework for analysing the judicial practice of these
international criminal courts and tribunals.
3 No precedent for the `theory'
From the qualitative analysis of the judgments of international criminal courts
and tribunals considered in this research, two general elements may be distilled.
These elements feature consistently in the approaches of such courts and
tribunals to the use of external judicial decisions, namely:
18
Terris et al, above n 5, 121.
19
Ibid, xvi, and Appendix B (`Judges Interviewed for This Book').
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1. As Terris et al observe, international criminal courts and tribunals do not
feel bound by the jurisprudence of other courts and tribunals.20
2. International criminal courts and tribunals, with some exceptions, con-
sistently approach external judicial decisions as `subsidiary means' for the
determination of rules of law, in accordance with the doctrine of sources.
However, any consistency in the approaches of international criminal courts and
tribunals to the use of external judicial decisions stops there. Beyond these two
elements, the research for this article has overwhelmingly demonstrated that it
is not possible to identify any consistent and systematic approaches to the use
of external judicial decisions. It would, therefore, be premature to speak of a
coherent `theory of precedent' along the lines of the one suggested by Terris et al.
On the contrary, the practice of the international criminal courts and tribunals
analysed in this article has been characterised by multiple, incoherent and, in
some cases, contradictory approaches to the use of external judicial decisions.
This article does not aim to provide an explanation for the incoherence.
Grover finds that the main reasons underlying the ad hoc Tribunals' inconsistent
approaches to interpretation include the vagueness of their statutes, as well as
the scarcity of normative guidance on the subject. She observes that this state
of affairs `opened the door for judges to develop their own methods which were
perhaps inspired by their legal training and/or understanding of international
criminal law's normativity'.21 These observations inform the following analysis
of the inconsistent approaches of international criminal courts and tribunals to
the use of external judicial decisions.
4 The first element: jurisprudence of other courts
and tribunals
The first element of the `theory of precedent', as suggested by Terris et al, is
that `no international judge seems to feel bound by the jurisprudence of another
court'.22 According to the authors, this is unsurprising given the fact that `courts
are not hierarchically organised, and all are, with few exceptions, self-contained




L Grover, `A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court' (2010) 21 EJIL 543, 547.
22
Terris et al, above n 5, 120.
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and defence of one's own judicial turf'.23 In the context of international criminal
adjudication, international criminal courts and tribunals have consistently held
that external judicial decisions have no binding force, but may bear persuasive
value.24 Yet rather than stemming from a sense of pride, as Terris et al suggest,
or from a desire to defend one's own judicial turf, the view that external judicial
decisions have no binding force in international criminal adjudication is based on
three grounds: a rigorous application of the doctrine of sources of international
law; the respect for the principle of legality; and the protection of individual
rights in criminal law. In this context, Cassese emphasises the specificity of
international criminal proceedings, which require greater circumspection and
a strict interpretation of the applicable rules.25 Similarly, in Duch, the ECCC
Supreme Court Chamber underscored that, in light of the protective function of
the principle of legality, external judicial decisions are non-binding and are not,
in and of themselves, primary sources of international law.26
Similarly, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Tadić stated that `the International
Tribunal is not bound by past doctrine',27 and in Kupreškić et al it held that `[t]he
Tribunal is not bound by precedents established by other international criminal
courts such as the Nuremberg or Tokyo Tribunals, let alone by cases brought
before national courts adjudicating international crimes'.28 In RUF, the SCSL
Trial Chamber underscored that it was `not bound by decisions of the ICTY
Appeals Chamber'29 and in Lubanga, the ICC Trial Chamber noted that `decisions
of other international courts and tribunals are not part of the directly applicable




See R Dixon and K A A Khan, Archbold on International Criminal Courts: Practice, Procedure and
Evidence (3rd edn, 2009) 16. In this context, however, one of the judges interviewed in the Terris et
al study intimated that `I'm not certain that there is great practical difference between a decision
that is binding, and one that is not binding but persuasive;' see Terris et al, above n 5, 121.
25
A Cassese, `The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
to the Ascertainment of General Principles of Law Recognized by the Community of Nations',
in S Yee and T Wang (eds), International Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essays in Memory of Li
Haopei (2001) 49.
26
Kaing Guek Eav (alias `Duch'), Appeal Judgment, Case File/Dossier No.
001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, 2012, 97.
27
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (aka `Dule'), Judgment, Case No IT-94-1-T, 1997, 654.
28
Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipović, Dragan Papić,
Vladimir Šantić, (aka `Vlado'), Judgment, Case No IT-95-16-T, 2000, 540.
29
Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao, Judgment, Case No SCSL-04-15-T,
2009, 295.
30
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Case No
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Thus, in the majority of cases, international criminal courts and tribunals
use external judicial decisions to determine rules of law, in accordance with the
doctrine of sources. However, in some cases these courts and tribunals rely
heavily—at times exclusively—on legal findings of external judicial decisions,
with little or no effort to conduct a first-hand examination of the rule of law
in question. Moreover, they occasionally use such decisions uncritically and fail
to follow the two-tiered procedure to ensure that such decisions are relied on
merely as subsidiary means.31 This approach could be characterised as `equivocal'
because the judgment may not indicate whether the court or tribunal considered
the external judicial decisions as a means of determining antecedent rules of law
or as direct sources of the rules in question.32
Moreover, in two cases, the court or tribunal expressly found that none
of the recognised sources provided an applicable rule, and proceeded to use
legal notions or findings from external judicial decisions that had not emanated
from one of the formal sources of international law. In effect, therefore, the
external judicial decisions containing such legal notions or findings constituted
the original source.33
In their discussion of this first element of the `theory,' Terris et al observe
that `jurisprudence of other courts is taken into consideration only when one's
own court has no useful precedents'.34 With respect to international criminal
ICC-01/04-01/06, 2012, 603.
31
The use of external judicial decisions as subsidiary means generally comprises the following
two-tiered procedure: (1) the court or tribunal satisfies itself that the legal notions or findings of a
given external judicial decision are grounded on a rule of law derived from one of the recognised
sources (international conventions, international customary law, or general principles of law);
and (2) the court or tribunal uses such legal notions or findings for guidance in the verification
of the existence or interpretation of such a rule of law (i.e. for the determination of a rule of law).
32
For instance, in the CDF case, in clarifying the meaning of `widespread and systematic' in
the context of crimes against humanity under Article 2 of the SCSL Statute, the SCSL Trial
Chamber failed to undertake any first-hand interpretation of the meaning of this phrase. Rather,
it relied almost exclusively on external judicial decisions from the ICTY, inmany instances simply
adopting or subscribing to the ICTY's views uncritically. See Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and
Allieu Kondewa, Judgment, Case No SCSL-04-14-T, 2007, 112.
33
The first case concerns Judge Li's famous dissent in Erdemović on the question whether duress
could be a complete defence to the massacre of innocent civilians at international law. See
Prosecutor v Dragen Erdemović, Judgment, Separate And Dissenting Opinion Of Judge Li, Case
No IT-96-22-A, 1997, 1 et seq. The second case is the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber's decision
in Duch, where the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber had to determine the appropriate test for
regulating adjudication of a multiplicity of offences for the same conduct (`concursus Delićtorum').
See Kaing Guek Eav (alias `Duch'), above n 26, 289 et seq.
34
Terris et al, above n 5, 120.
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adjudication, the present research has found that, although the degree of reliance
on external judicial decisions is somewhat dependent on the state of development
of the internal case law of the referring court or tribunal, this observation applies
to those issues that are relatively settled and uncontroversial in the court or
tribunal's internal jurisprudence. Indeed, where specific issues are relatively
well-settled in a court or tribunal's internal jurisprudence, a gradual shift in the
locus of reference from external judicial decisions to the internal jurisprudence
of the referring court or tribunal may, in some cases, be observed. For instance,
although, in order to ascertain the customary international law status of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the earlier judgments of the ICTY relied
on the holdings of the ICJ,35 as this issue became relatively more settled in the
internal jurisprudence of the ICTY, a gradual shift in the locus of reference from
external judicial decisions of the ICJ to the internal jurisprudence of the ICTY
began to take place, and the later judgments of the ICTY began to rely exclusively
on internal jurisprudence with respect to this matter.36
Conversely, with respect to issues which remain unsettled and controversial
in the internal jurisprudence of a referring court or tribunal, or with respect to
novel issues (which continue to crop up throughout the lifespan of international
criminal courts and tribunals),37 such courts and tribunals have, generally,
continued to have recourse to external judicial decisions.
Finally, with respect to this element, Terris et al assert that `[a]lthough some
judgesmight bemorewilling than others to cite, citing is generally done sparingly,
selectively, and grudgingly'.38 While the present research has not, as such,
addressed the question of selectivity, it may be safely said that, in the context
of international criminal adjudication, citing has certainly been done neither
`sparingly' nor `grudgingly'. Indeed, international criminal courts and tribunals
make frequent and varied use of external judicial decisions. This happens both
35
See, for instance, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (aka `Dule'), Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No IT-94-1-T, 1995, 98; and Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalić,
Zdravko Mucić (aka `Pavo'), Hazim Delić, Esad Landžo (aka `Zenga'), Judgment, Case No IT-96-21-T,
1998, 303.
36
See, for instance, Prosecutor v Naser Orić, Judgment, Case No IT-03-68-T, 2006, 261; and
Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, Judgment, Case No IT-04-84-T, 2008,
34.
37
For instance, over a decade after the ICTY was established, the Blaškić Appeals Chamber noted
that the Tribunal had not yet `had the occasion to pronounce' on the question of the necessary
mens rea in relation to ordering under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. See Prosecutor v Tihomir
Blaškić, Judgment, Case No IT-95-14-A, 2004, 33.
38
Terris et al, above n 5, 120.
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directly, to derive guidance from the legal notions or findings of a given external
judicial decision, with a view to verifying the existence or interpretation of a
particular rule of law; and indirectly, in order to borrow a review of state practice
and opinio juris in the context of customary international law, or a survey of
national jurisdiction in the context of general principles of law (`reviews and
surveys').
With respect to the direct use of external judicial decisions, Judge Shahabud-
deen noted in his declaration in Furundžija that in interpreting a rule of inter-
national law, international criminal courts and tribunals may `see value in con-
sulting the experience of other judicial bodies with a view to enlightening [them-
selves] as to how the principle is to be applied in the particular circumstances
before [them]'.39 In Stakić, the ICTY Trial Chamber noted that `when interpret-
ing the relevant substantive criminal norms of the Statute, the Trial Chamber has
used previous decisions of international tribunals', including the external judicial
decisions of the ICTR and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.40 The ECCC
Supreme Court Chamber, in Duch, noted that the ECCC `relied heavily' on inter-
national human rights case law.41 The Kupreškić et al Trial Chamber went even
further, emphasising that `judicial decisions may prove to be of invaluable impor-
tance for the determination of existing law'.42
In the literature, Cryer notes that `[t]he ICTY and the ICTRhave had reference
to domestic, as well as international, case law'.43 Cassese finds the ad hocTribunals
have, on occasion, `drawn upon Strasbourg case law in order to clarify concepts
that are ambiguous or unclear in international law'.44 Moreover, with respect to
the ICTY's use of external judicial decisions from national courts, Nollkaemper
states that the ICTY `has made extensive use of national case law in interpreting
and applying its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence and in determining
points of general international law'.45 Furthermore, Nerlich observes that `the
decisions of the [ICC] Chambers often contain references to the jurisprudence of
39
Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija, Judgment, Case No IT-95-17/1-A, 2000, 258 (Declaration Of Judge
Shahabuddeen).
40
Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, Judgment, Case No IT-97-24-T, 2003, 414.
41
Kaing Guek Eav (alias `Duch'), above n 26, 431.
42
Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipović, Dragan Papić,
Vladimir Šantić, (aka `Vlado'), above n 28, 541. Emphasis added.
43
R Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn, 2010) 12.
44
Cassese, above n 25, 31.
45
A Nollkaemper, `Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis of
the Practice of the ICTY', in G Boas andW Schabas (eds), International Criminal Law Developments
in the Case Law of the ICTY (2003) 277.
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the two ad hoc Tribunals of the United Nations'.46
With respect to the indirect use of external judicial decisions, international
criminal courts or tribunals have used such decisions to borrow their reviews
or surveys. Such borrowed reviews or surveys could serve to supplement the
referring court or tribunal's own review or survey on the same or similar issue
and, indeed, may save the referring court or tribunal from having to undertake
it from scratch.47 Cryer points out that `[a]fter all, where cases contain a detailed
review of State practice and/or opinio juris, it is far simpler to refer to the relevant
case than repeat the discussion it contains'.48 For instance, in both the CDF and
RUF cases, the SCSLTrial Chambers relied on the Strugar Trial Judgment's review
of `case law developed by the military tribunals in the aftermath of World War II'
to enumerate the factors that a chamber may take into account in determining
whether a superior has discharged his duty to prevent the commission of a
crime.49
While the advantages of the indirect approach to the use of external judicial
decisions are apparent—in terms of efficiency gains and avoiding the duplication
of efforts—it is also clear that this approach has to be adopted with caution, as
relying on a review or survey which was undertaken by another court or tribunal,
founded on a different statutory framework, carries certain risks. These risks
may include the danger of such reviews or surveys being defective or incomplete
and, particularly with respect to reviews or surveys undertaken by trial-level
courts or tribunals, their liabiliy to appellate modification. Nevertheless, the
analysis of a referring court or tribunal which engages with and scrutinises the
reviews or surveys from an external judicial decision is likely to bemore thorough
and rigorous.
46
V Nerlich, `The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent in Proceedings Before the ICC', in C Stahn
& G Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (2009) 305-306.
47
Peil makes a similar point with respect to the use of the teachings of publicists, namely, `[w]here
a publicist has conducted a thorough review of State practice and concluded that the threshold
for a rule of customary international law has (or has not) been met, judges frequently rely upon
those teachings, rather than citing directly to primary evidence of State practice'. See M Peil,
`Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the International
Court of Justice' (2012) 1 CJICL 136, 153.
48
R Cryer, `Neither Here Nor There? The Status of International Criminal Jurisprudence in the
International and UK Legal Orders', in K H Kaikobad and M Bohlander (eds), International Law
and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice: Essays in Honour of Colin Warbrick (2009) 184.
49
Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, above n 19, 248; and Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay,
Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao, above n 16, 315.
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5 The second element: judicial comity
The second element identified by Terris et al is that `if, on a given point of law,
judges of one court feel differently than those of another court, out of judicial
comity they will simply omit to take cognizance of judgments that do not support
the reasoning chosen. Citing to say `they got it wrong' is generally avoided, even
severely frowned upon'.50 In the context of international criminal adjudication,
the present research has found that instances in which international criminal
courts and tribunals adopt a conciliatory approach towards external judicial
decisions (i.e. distinguishing decisions which appear relevant) far outnumber
instances in which such courts and tribunals adopt a competitive approach (i.e.
departing from external judicial decisions that appear to interpret the same, or
a substantially similar rule of law, without distinguishing the matter). In this
context, Simma holds that the principle of comity, that is, of respect for the
competence of other courts and tribunals, could `be considered an emerging
general principle of international procedural law'.51
However, it has been observed that `the effort, however admirable, to serve
the cause of law through the art of distinguishing has its limits'.52 In a number
of instances, international criminal courts and tribunals have, in the words of
Terris et al, cited to say `they got it wrong'. In particular, the present research has
identified instances in which courts and tribunals have departed from external
judicial decisions that, in their view, have been made in error (`per incuriam') or
that are not in the interests of justice.53 In some cases, however, departures from
external judicial decisions remain cryptic. For instance, in Furundžija, the ICTY
Trial Chamber departed obliquely from the Constitutional Court of Colombia's
holding that `the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols passed into
customary law in their entirety', without providing any justification.54
50
Terris et al, above n 5, 120.
51
B Simma, `Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner' (2009) 20
EJIL 265, 285–287.
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M Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (1996) 126.
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For instance, in Čelebići, in the context of superior responsibility, the ICTY Appeals Chamber
departed from a finding by the ICTR Trial Chamber in Kayishema et al, that `powers of influence
not amounting to formal powers of command provide a sufficient basis for the imposition of
command responsibility,' because, according to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, this finding was
`based on a misstatement' and, therefore, had to be accorded `no weight'. See Prosecutor v Zejnil
Delalić, Zdravko Mucić (aka `Pavo'), Hazim Delić, and Esad Landžo (aka `Zenga'), Judgment, Case No
IT-96-21-A, 2001, 265.
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Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija, Judgment, Case No IT-95-17/1-T, 1998, 137.
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In other cases, international criminal courts and tribunals appear reluctant
to `acknowledge that a change has occurred'.55 For instance, in Muhimana, the
ICTR Trial Chamber adopted a somewhat ambivalent stance with respect to the
appropriate definition of rape. It averred that the broad, conceptual definition of
rape articulated in Akayesu and the narrower, mechanical definition put forward
by Furundžija/Kunarac `are not incompatible or substantially different in their
application'.56 Yet, the conceptual definition of rape articulated in Akayesu is
undoubtedly broader in scope, andmay encompass additional acts and omissions,
than the narrower, mechanical definition of Furundžija/Kunarac. The holding in
Muhimana thus appears not accurate.
Moreover, with respect to Terris et al's suggestion that judges could simply
`omit to take cognizance of judgments that do not support the reasoning chosen',57
there is a growing expectation that international criminal courts and tribunals
ought to take express account of relevant external judicial decisions, even if
contradictory, particularly in view of the duty of circumspection and the principle
of legality. Due to the lack of formal structures and lines of communication
across courts and tribunals, this expectation may entail significant difficulties.
However, the present research has found that where international criminal courts
and tribunals have failed to take express account of relevant external judicial
decisions, their judgments are—at least in academic writing—considered to be
less persuasive and are subject to intense criticism.58
6 The third element: substance over form
With respect to the third element, Terris et al observe that:
55
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57
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of crimes against humanity, for taking into account three Canadian cases that supported the
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the formal nature of a judicial finding does not matter. Judges con-
sider decisions of other international courts regardless of whether
they are final or preliminary judgments, orders, nonbinding advi-
sory opinions, or anything else. What they look at is the jurispru-
dence rather than any specific case; what ultimately seems to matter
is only that the reasoning that led the other tribunal to a given con-
clusion is legally sound and persuasive.59
In the context of international criminal adjudication, this observation is largely
supported by the findings of the present research. International criminal courts
and tribunals have relied not only on final judgments and decisions, but also, inter
alia, on advisory opinions60 and the submissions of advocates-general.61
With respect to the SCSL, for instance, Article 20(3) of the SCSL Statute states
that, in hearing appeals, `[t]he judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court
shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda'.62 Although Article 20(3) of
the SCSL Statute only mentions the Appeals Chamber, the SCSL Trial Chamber
subsequently found `as a matter of course, the provision equally applies to triers
of fact at first instance'.63
While international criminal courts and tribunals rely on various types
of judicial findings, the present research has found that, when relying on
first instance decisions, they do not always take full account of the fact that
such decisions are subject to reversal on appeal. In Kunarac et al, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber had to verify whether the existence of a plan or policy (the
`policy requirement') was a legal ingredient of crimes against humanity under
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute.64 In its analysis, the Appeals Chamber relied,
inter alia, on the Kosovo District Court case of Trajkovic,65 which appeared to
59
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61
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64
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6 March 2001.
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support its interpretation that no policy requirement for crimes against humanity
was required at international law.66 However, about six months before the
ICTY Appeals Chamber delivered its judgment, the Supreme Court of Kosovo
overturned the Trajkovic decision in a manner material to its use by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber.67 Nevertheless, the Kunarac et al Appeals Judgment made no
express mention of this turn of events, and it continued to rest, in part, on the
reasoning of the Trajkovic first instance decision that had been overturned.
7 The fourth element: unity and fragmentation
The fourth element of the `theory of precedent' outlined by Terris et al holds that:
In the judges' minds, international courts seem to be divided
between generalists (like the ICJ) and specialists (all others), and
between regional courts and the so-called universal courts, that is
to say, those whose jurisdiction is not restricted to any particular
geographic area. This means that, fourth, specialized courts will
consider, quote, and defer to the ICJ on matters of general public
international law. … Arguably, this should also imply that the ICJ
will defer to specialized tribunals concerning matters over which
they have special knowledge or competence, but, to date, the ICJ
has not done so.68
Although the UN Charter does not formally endow the ICJ with `exclusive
jurisdiction'69 Schwarzenberger asserts that the ICJ, and its predecessor the
PCIJ, have to be accorded `pride of place in the hierarchy of the elements of
law-determining agencies'.70 In this respect, it has been noted that well reasoned
and strongly supported decisions of the ICJ `will be powerfully influential for
other tribunals deciding questions of international law, even though there is no
66
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68
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69
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formal stare decisis effect'.71 In the context of international criminal adjudication,
international criminal courts and tribunals have, indeed, by and large considered,
quoted and deferred to the ICJ on matters of general public international law.
For instance, in Čelebići, the ICTY Trial Chamber acknowledged that a particular
decision of the ICJ `constitutes an important source of jurisprudence on various
issues of international law'72 and, in Aleksovski, the ICTY Appeals Chamber
emphasised that the decisions of the ICJ may be accorded considerable weight
`due to their perceived status as authoritative expressions of the law'.73
Yet, there have been a small number of cases in which international criminal
courts and tribunals have come to a different conclusion from the ICJ, the most
prominent of these being the collision between the ICJ inNicaragua and the ICTY
in Tadić.74 However, as one commentator observes, `[a]mong the tribunals vested
with international criminal jurisdiction, the ICTY has made such ample use of
ICJ jurisprudence that the divergence in the Tadić judgment has to be seen in
perspective'.75
With respect to the second leg of this element, namely that the ICJ may
itself defer to specialised tribunals, it has been noted that the ICJ has `hardly
ever openly referred to other international courts and tribunals'.76 However, in
the Genocide case the ICJ did attach `the utmost importance to the factual and
legal findings made by the ICTY in ruling on the criminal liability of the accused
before it',77 which could be seen to reflect the ICJ's respect for the ICTY's specialist
competence in this field.
In addition to relying on the generalist competence of the ICJ, international
criminal courts and tribunals regularly rely on the specialist external judicial
decisions of other courts and tribunals operating within different branches of
international law, in particular human rights courts. For instance, in Kunarac et
al, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that `[b]ecause of the paucity of precedent in
the field of international humanitarian law, the Tribunal has, on many occasions,
had recourse to instruments and practices developed in the field of human rights
71
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law'.78 The decisions of international and regional human rights courts have
been accorded highly persuasive value, particularly when the issue before the
international criminal courts and tribunals was one of due process.
8 The fifth element: universal criminal courts?
The fifth element put forward by Terris et al, namely that universal courts `might
consider, but will refrain from quoting regional or national courts',79 would not
appear to be directly applicable to the specific context of international criminal
adjudication. In this respect, the definition of `universal' courts adopted by the
authors is courts `whose jurisdiction is not restricted to any particular geographic
area'.80 It should be noted, first, that with reference to the specific context of
international criminal adjudication, this is not a particularly felicitous definition,
as courts and tribunals which would normally be regarded as international,
would not be considered `universal' under this definition. Indeed, of the five
international criminal courts and tribunals covered by the present research, only
one—the ICC—falls within the definition of a `universal' court. The jurisdictions
of the others—namely the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the ECCC—are all
restricted ratione loci and cannot, therefore, be considered `universal' according
to this definition. Given that, at the time of writing, the ICC had only delivered
one final judgment, namely Lubanga, it would be difficult to assess how frequently
this court would quote decisions of regional or national courts. In Lubanga,
the ICC Trial Chamber relied extensively on judicial decisions from sister
international criminal courts and tribunals, such as the ICTY81 and the SCSL.82
It also referenced two judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,
primarily because these had been cited in the Defence submissions.83
With respect to the use of judicial decisions from national courts, Terris
et al observe that `[d]omestic courts rarely pronounce themselves on rules of
international law; they are rather a more useful source when it comes to
searching for general principles of law. Additionally, they seem to be considered
78
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a last resort, to be looked at only when international sources do not help'.84
In line with this observation, international criminal courts and tribunals have
generally considered that they should first `explore all the means available at the
international level before turning to national law',85 and that national judicial
decisions should only be used as a last resort. Indeed, an order of natural
selection appears to have developed in the practice of international criminal
courts and tribunals, which indicates that relevant international judicial decisions
are preferred over national judicial decisions. For instance, in Furundžija the ICTY
Trial Chamber considered that the decisions of courts and tribunals applying
national law were `less helpful'.86 And in Kupreškić et al, the ICTY Trial Chamber
stated that national judicial decisions `would carry relatively less weight'.87
Cassese notes that, when using national judicial decisions, international
criminal courts and tribunals sometimes adopt a `wild' and mechanical ap-
proach.88 For instance, in order to determine whether the Tribunal had respected
the accused's right to be promptly informed of the charges against him, the ICTR
Appeals Chamber in Barayagwiza had to determine whether the period during
which the accused was held in custody in Cameroon at the ICTR Prosecutor's
request should be counted, even though the accused was not yet under the phys-
ical control of the Prosecutor.89 After citing external judicial decisions from the
United States and Singapore, the Barayagwiza Appeals Chamber determined that
`Cameroon was holding the Appellant in constructive custody for the Tribunal'.90
Conspicuously absent from the Chamber's analysis, however, was any express at-
tempt to transpose the findings of decisions from these two national jurisdictions
to the specificities of international criminal law and the context of international
criminal proceedings.91
The dangers of a mechanical reliance on national judicial decisions may be
especially pronounced with respect to decisions that appear to be interpreting
international law but that, in reality, are solely based on particular interpretations
of national law and that could therefore be misleading (`red herring' decisions).
84
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For instance, a succession of ICTY Trial Chambers mechanically relied on the
expansive interpretation of `civilians', as articulated in the French case of Barbie92
(while rarely referring to the specific national circumstances that gave rise to
this expansive interpretation) to find that the term `civilians', for the purposes
of crimes against humanity, included those who were members of a resistance
movement and former combatants.93 However, this expansive interpretation of
`civilians' was subsequently rejected by the ICTY Appeals Chambers, inter alia,
in Blaškić,94 Kordić et al,95 and Galić,96 in favour of a narrower interpretation.
Conspicuous in its absence from the findings of these ICTY Appeals Chambers
was any explicit reference to the Barbie case.97
In other cases, however, international criminal courts and tribunals have
adopted a more reflective approach, which implies `a rigorous legal conception
of the role and functions of international tribunals and the sources of law from
which they may draw'.98 This was the case, for instance, with respect to the
Kupreškić et al Trial Judgment.99 In particular, this research found that the
reflective approach requires international criminal courts and tribunals to ensure
that any legal notions or findings derived from external judicial decisions: (1) are
appropriately transposed in light of the specificities of international criminal law
and the context of international criminal proceedings; (2) take into account the
inter-temporality of rules of international law; and (3) are in consonance with
international law.
From the above, it is clear that international criminal courts and tribunals
have adopted a plethora of approaches to the use of external judicial decisions.
Therefore, it is premature to speak of general and systematic approaches to the
92
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use of external judicial decisions or, indeed, of any `theory of precedent' along
the lines of the one suggested by Terris et al. International criminal courts and
tribunals ought to more expressly specify their approaches to the use of external
judicial decisions in their judgments. In addition, more research in this area is
required, to attain specific normative guidance on this subject. These measures
may, to varying extents, all contribute to promoting greater coherence in the
approaches of courts and tribunals to the use of external judicial decisions.
9 Concluding remarks
As noted in the Introduction, according to Terris et al, `[t]he role of precedent
across international courts has not yet been thoroughly studied, since it is only
recently that the number of international rulings of most courts has become
sizeable'.100 While this observation was made with respect to international
adjudication generally, it also applies to international criminal adjudication,
where the existing literature has tended to confine itself to studying the use of
external judicial decisions from one or more specific sources (such as decisions
of human rights courts or of national courts).101 Even within this confined
perspective, however, it has been noted that this subject `has received only limited
scholarly attention'.102 This article has aimed to provide a first step in the study
of the approaches of international criminal courts and tribunals to the use of
external judicial decisions. It is hoped that this brief articlemay serve as a basis for
further research in this area. For instance, as the body of judgments rendered by
the ICC becomesmore sizeable, it may be important to study how the approaches
of the chambers of the ICC to the use of external judicial decisions would
compare to the approaches of the ad hoc Tribunals and/or the internationalised
courts. Moreover, in the same manner as the judicial decisions of the ad hoc
Tribunals' predecessors, namely the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, played
a crucial role in the development of the former's jurisprudence, it would be
significant to examine the contribution of judicial decisions of ad hoc Tribunals
and internationalised courts to the jurisprudence of the ICC.103 Finally, although
100
Terris et al, above n 5, 120.
101
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the ICC Trial Chamber did provide some indication of its approach to the use
of external judicial decisions in Lubanga,104 it would be interesting to consider
whether other chambers of the ICC specify, in a more direct and detailed manner,
their approaches to the use of external judicial decisions in future judgments.
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